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1. Introduction 
 
Many economists have supported the view that exchange rate policies played a pivotal 
role  in  promoting  exports  in  “High  Performing  Asian  Economies”  (HPAEs). 
Proponents believe that HPAEs avoided extreme exchange rate appreciations, which 
contributed to their successful development. For example, World Bank (1993) and 
Roemer  (1994)  claimed  that  exchange  rate  management  was  one  of  the  most 
important reasons for rapid growth in East Asia. In his view, Asian countries kept 
their nominal exchange rates (NER) close to market clearing levels, while parallel-
market premiums were very low. More importantly their real exchange rates (RERs) 
remained constant or depreciated gradually. Such views, perhaps ironically, remained 
prevalent  even  after  the  Asian  crisis  of  1997  when  some  of  these  countries  were 
widely blamed for their exchange rate mismanagement. In a recent article Shatz and 
Tarr (2000) echoed similar sentiments and argued that a large reason for rapid Asian 
growth  was exchange rate management. Therefore, the debate is still relevant and 
alive.   
In contrast, the inappropriate exchange rate policies pursued by many Latin 
American  countries  in  the  late  1970s  reduced  economic  growth  rates  and  were 
instrumental  in  unleashing  the  debt  crisis.  Overvalued  RERs  in  many  African 
countries were responsible for the dramatic deterioration in agricultural sectors and 
trade balances (Edwards, 1988). It is often argued that up to the 1980s, Sub-Saharan 
African states resisted devaluation, and there is strong evidence that the overvaluation 
of RERs contributed a great deal towards Africa’s poor economic performance. Thus, 
the  poor  economic  performances  of  African  and  Latin  American  countries  can 
partially  be  explained  by  their  inward  oriented  trade  regimes  in  general,  and 
overvalued exchange rates in particular. Despite the fact that these ideas became the 
conventional wisdom of the 1980s and 1990s and were echoed by many researchers,
1 
the empirical literature is rather lacking in compelling evidence to support such views. 
Moreover, proponents are oddly silent as to why these countries have adopted such 
                                                            
1 See for example Dollar (1992), Ghura and Grennes (1993), Klau (1998), Sekkat and Varoudakis 
(1998), Sahn, Dorosh and Younger (1996), Shatz and Tarr (2000) and World Bank (1984, 1993 and 
1994). This list includes researchers from the political economy perspective such as Sender and Smith 
(1988).   4 
disastrous exchange rate policies, and why they were so reluctant to devalue when 
their currencies were overvalued.  
The aim of this paper is to challenge the above views on the exchange rate 
policies  adopted  by  the  East  Asian,  Latin  American  and  African  countries.  The 
empirical results provide no evidence to verify that the exchange rate policies of the 
East  Asian  economies  were  significantly  different  from  those  of  other  developing 
countries. Therefore the reasoning behind the success story of HPAEs and the dismal 
performance of other developing countries by their exchange rate policies remains 
unproven.  
The next section briefly deals with the theoretical debate over exchange rate 
policies. It emphasises the difficulties of defining the equilibrium real exchange rate 
(ERER).  Section  three  summarises  the  background  of  the  debate.  Section  four 
discusses  the  alternative  measures  of  real  exchange  rate.  Through  the  analysis 
produced in section two, section five abandons the concept of ERER and presents the 
empirical evidence by initially comparing the RERs of HPAEs with other developing 
countries. Section six presents concluding remarks. 
 
2. Exchange Rate Policy 
 
There is little disagreement over the necessity of maintaining a “realistic” exchange 
rate  in  order  to  stay  competitive  in  international  markets.  What  is  meant  by  a 
“realistic” exchange rate is, however, controversial. One opinion, which favours the 
laissez faire approach, seeks to set the RER at a level that reflects the scarcity of 
foreign exchange within prevailing markets.  An alternative view, however, suggests 
that,  particularly  in  the  case  of  low-income  countries,  the  value  and  allocation  of 
foreign exchange can best be handled by government policies. Such policies include 
import controls, subsidies, taxes and multiple exchange rates (Mengisteab, 1995). 
The  World  Bank  and  IMF  have  been  consistent  advocates  of  so-called 
exchange rate “protectionism”, as opposed to other forms of protectionism. This is 
because exchange rate devaluations do not discriminate against the “winner” sectors 
and  allow  the  principle  of comparative advantage to decide which sectors will be 
competing in international markets. In this view, this is the best policy option for 
developing countries wishing to stay competitive and eliminate the possible negative   5 
effects of trade liberalisation. Governments should not intervene with trade in any 
other way but maintain competitiveness by devaluations and let the markets decide 
which sectors will be the winners (World Bank, 1993). 
According  to  Shatz  and  Tarr  (2000)  there  are  six  channels  via  which  an 
overvalued  exchange  rate  can  damage  the  economy  and  growth  rates:  1.  by 
discriminating against exports; 2. by reinforcing increased protectionism that reduces 
competition; 3. by reducing productivity advances; 4. by inducing capital flight; 5. 
through  mismanagement  in  the  allocation  and  rationing  of  foreign  exchange  by 
governments; 6. by provoking a tight monetarist policy response in defence of the 
overvalued exchange rate that can lead to severe economic recession. Before assessing 
the precision of the above arguments, there is a need to discuss what is meant by RER 
overvaluation or misalignment. 
Currency overvaluation, or misalignment, is usually defined as a deviation of 
the actual RER from a theoretical equilibrium long run RER that is assumed to bring 
the external and internal markets into equilibrium.
2 It is important to stress that this 
definition is a theoretical dictum and assumes that there is a single, market determined 
RER level that brings the internal and external markets into equilibrium. In this sense, 
overvaluation of the exchange rate is a diversion from the functioning of the free 
market  economy  and  implies  protectionism.  This  is  so  because  an  overvalued 
exchange rate would create a trade deficit by encouraging imports and discouraging 
exports, and the only way to reduce a trade deficit is to control imports by imposing 
protectionist policies, such as tariffs and quotas. 
The literature acknowledges that the equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) 
does not imply a constant RER. It is a moving equilibrium rate that is determined by 
“fundamentals”.  The  ERER  may  change  as  a  result  of  technological  progress, 
permanent shifts in tastes, changes in external terms of trade, capital and aid flows, 
foreign borrowing, changes in domestic and world interest rates and so on. In general, 
changes in ERER will be the result of permanent changes in the underlying structural 
conditions of the economy. There are also, however, “unjustified” departures of the 
RER from its equilibrium value.  
                                                            
2 A theoretical exposition can be found in Parikh and Bailey (2001)   6 
Many authors, however, regard policy variables such as trade restrictions, as 
one of the fundamentals.
3 The inclusion of trade restrictions as determinants of the 
ERER implies that RER appreciations resulting from such trade policies will alter the 
ERER, but will not result in overvaluation. This signifies a marked difference from 
the free market approach where changes in RER as a result of protectionist measures 
imply overvaluation. In our view the latter approach is sensible, because it recognises 
that a change in RER as a result of interventionist trade policies may not imply a 
decline in competitiveness.  But it also exhibits weaknesses. Not only does it imply 
that such protectionist policies may cause the exchange rate to appreciate, but also that 
any  exchange  rate  appreciation  would  inevitably  induce  or  give  rise  to  more 
protectionist measures. For example Edwards (1988: 22) admits that “[m]isalignments 
usually are accompanied by the imposition of a battery of exchange and trade controls 
intended to slow the drainage of foreign exchange reserves that occurs when the actual 
RER is overvalued”. There is an inconsistency in this contention. He, on the one hand 
argues  that  ERER  will  be  determined  by  “fundamentals”,  including  protectionist 
measures such as import tariffs and quotas, implying that such policies are not a cause 
of  overvaluation.  But  on  the  other  hand  states  that  overvaluation  results  in 
protectionist trade policies. If misalignments are accompanied by the imposition of 
trade  controls,  then  it  makes  sense  to  argue  that  the  reverse  is  also  true;  that  the 
imposition  of  trade  controls  will  result  in  misalignments.  As  Sahn,  Dorosh  and 
Younger (1996) contend, trade policies in many developing countries have been an 
integral part of foreign exchange rate rationing and broader exchange rate policies. 
In the short-run, overvalued RER can be maintained without imposing trade 
restrictions. In this case overvaluation will manifest itself as a persistent trade deficit, 
which will be financed by using foreign currency reserves or by foreign borrowing. 
This course of action, however, is not sustainable in the long run and a devaluation, 
and/or trade restrictions, will become inevitable. In the absence of these measures, 
reserves  will  be  exhausted  and  the  external  debt  will  become  untenable.  As  a 
consequence, a persistent trade deficit financed from reserves and/or borrowing, may 
be a sign of overvaluation. An uncontrolled accumulation of debt, however, may also 
                                                            
3 See Edwards (1988 and 1994), Elbadawi (1994), Ghura and Grennes (1993). Such policies include 
restriction on imports either by an increase in import tariffs or a rise in quantitative restrictions, export 
taxes and subsidies and the composition of government expenditure.   7 
be a sign of a country’s persistent economic problems, and differentiating between 
these two scenarios may be very problematical. Moreover, there is no easy method of 
calculating at what point foreign borrowing becomes unsustainable.  
In  our  view,  defining  overvaluation  to  the  exclusion  of  protectionist  trade 
policies is problematic. Overvaluation may be caused by and indeed lead to more 
protectionist trade policies.
4 This approach is not concerned with the level of trade, as 
long as internal and external markets are in equilibrium.
5 Moreover, if, as this view 
implies, overvaluation cannot be sustained in the long run, it is not easy to argue that 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  Latin  American  countries  have  in  fact  suffered  from 
persistent long-term RER overvaluation.   
Therefore  the  first  approach  provides  a  clearer  definition  of  RER 
overvaluation  by  proposing  that  overvaluation  is  the  equivalent  of  protectionism. 
Once misalignment is defined in this way, however, one cannot simply argue that 
RER overvaluation will always lead to poor economic performance. Misalignment 
may or may not be detrimental depending on country specific circumstances. It may 
stem  from  conscious  trade  policy  choice  or  pure  mismanagement.  The  boundary 
between these two is thin and there is no easy way of distinguishing between where 
misalignment  as  a  conscious  trade  policy  ends,  and  misalignment  through  pure 
mismanagement begins.  
There are in fact good reasons for a country to have an “overvalued” exchange 
rate. As Rodrik (1986) argues, a policy that deliberately maintains the exchange rate at 
a disequilibrium level can be welfare-increasing by promoting structural change. In 
other words, an overvalued exchange rate can be used as an effective industrial policy 
tool, which indirectly taxes the traditional exports in order to subsidize the industrial 
sector. Rodrik argues that in the absence of any more direct means by which this 
transfer can be accomplished, overvaluation might look very attractive. 
From the above it is clear that exchange rate policy cannot be analysed in 
isolation  and  should  be  located  in  a  broader  industrial/trade  policy  context. 
Overvaluation should be seen within the framework of a set of long-term development 
goals and not short-term market (dis)equilibrium. Adopting this view would lead us to 
                                                            
4 For example overvaluation of the RER will cause trade disequilibrium that will eventually require 
interventionist policies to restore the balance.  
5 For example, a trade restriction may cause an appreciation of the ERER and reduce trade but this will 
not be considered overvaluation.    8 
conclude  that  a  currency  is  overvalued  only  if  it  damages  long-term  development 
goals, and in parallel with this reasoning it is possible to similarly consider the ERER 
as “overvalued” if it is damaging to a country’s long-term development goals.  
Moreover, the idea that RER devaluations will always bring an economy into 
equilibrium is flawed because it does not take the country specific market conditions 
into account. Two problems occur with this approach. First, even if devaluations can 
eliminate external disequilibrium, it may not be in the interest of a country’s long-term 
development objectives to do so. This may be the case, for instance, if devaluations 
reduce demand for imported inputs, such as machinery, spare parts and fertilizers, by 
increasing  their  prices  without  producing  a  corresponding  rise  in  exports. 
Devaluations  may  also  cause  inflation  through  a  wage-price  spiral.  Second, 
devaluations do not guarantee external equilibrium. The effectiveness of devaluations 
in achieving external equilibrium will depend on the causes of the disequilibrium, and 
the structure of the economy. In other words, the relationship between devaluations 
and  external  balance  is  at  best  inconclusive  (Mussa,  1984  and  Maizels,  1986). 
According  to  Mengisteab  (1995:  107)  the  following  factors  determine  whether 
devaluations will bring external markets into equilibrium: 1. the level of competition 
(including responses of competitors to a given country’s devaluation) and the export 
restrictions facing a country, such as quotas; 2. the elasticity of the supply of export 
commodities; 3. the elasticity of foreign demand for the devaluing country’s exports; 
4. the elasticity of the demand for foreign products in the devaluing country, and 5. the 
nature  of  the  causes  of  the  external  disequilibrium,  i.e.  whether  it  is  caused  by 
uncompetitive costs of production or by external factors, such as declining demand 
and prices on the international market. 
External equilibrium for measuring RER overvaluation is not even a robust 
criterion.  If  countries  do  not  have  access  to  external  finance  and  do  not  have 
significant  resources  to  finance  imports,  there  will  always  be  trade  equilibrium, 
whether or not the RER is overvalued. In this case one needs to determine whether 
free  market  equilibrium  is  superior  to  a  “managed”  equilibrium  where  there  are 
controls over imports. For example when there is an external shock, i.e. a sharp fall in 
exports,  a  country  may  leave  everything  to  market  forces  and  RER  will  then 
depreciate to reduce overall imports.  As an alternative it may prefer to discontinue   9 
importing certain commodities to allow for the importation of more essential items, 
without RER depreciation.   
Finally  it  is  not  entirely  true  to  say  that  RER  cannot  be  overvalued  in 
unregulated  markets.  As  Ghei  and  Kamin  (1999)  argue,  market  determined  RER 
might reflect expectations, political concerns, capital flight, market imperfections and 
other speculative factors not directly related to the ERER. Even high domestic interest 
rates  and  massive  speculative  capital  inflows  (‘hot  money’),  two  of  the 
“fundamentals”, may also cause an appreciation of the RER and reduce exports.  
 
3. Background of the Debate 
 
It  is  often  argued  that,  although  most  developing  countries  liberalised  their  trade 
during the 1980s and 1990s, some countries maintained overvalued exchange rates, 
which counteracted their trade liberalisation. According to Shatz and Tarr (2000) over 
25 percent of countries have overvalued exchange rates that harm their prosperity. In 
fact, overvalued exchange rates are considered an important reason for protectionism, 
and in this view, countries with overvalued exchange rates are unable to return to the 
liberal trade policies that promote economic growth. A number of studies
6 suggest that 
RER misalignment and variability are strongly related to low economic growth, low 
productivity, low export growth and low agriculture growth. According to Bouton, 
Jones, and Kiguel (1994), devaluation of the RER is crucial to successful reforms. 
They  argue  that  compared  to  three  areas  of  policy  –  exchange  rate,  fiscal,  and 
monetary policies –exchange rate reform has the biggest impact on growth.  
In particular, poor economic performance in Africa is attributed to overvalued 
exchange  rates.  Many  researchers  argue  that  there  is  strong  evidence  that  the 
overvaluation  of  RERs  contributed  a  great  deal  towards  Africa’s  poor  economic 
performance (Ghura and Grennes, 1993; Klau, 1998; Sekkat and Varoudakis, 1998; 
Shatz and Tarr, 2000). Foroutan (1997) claims that post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa 
adopted remarkably similar economic policies, which produced a strong bias against 
trade.  These  policies  included  import  and  export  quotas  and  prohibitions,  price 
controls, foreign exchange controls, interest rate ceilings, state-owned enterprises, and 
                                                            
6 See for example Cottani, Cavallo and Khan (1990), Edwards (1988 and 1989)   10 
marketing  monopolies.  As  a  result,  by  the  early  1980s,  many  Sub-Saharan  Africa 
countries experienced balance of payments problems and economic deterioration.  
  Although the role of external shocks in triggering these problems is generally 
recognised (Bouton, Jones, and Kiguel, 1994), failures of governments to adjust to 
shocks  are  blamed  for  their  poor  performance.  In  this  view,  despite  the  fall  in 
commodity prices during the early and mid 1980s, governments continued to spend 
and financed their expenditure by foreign borrowing, which led to the overvaluation 
of the RER, in the absence of adjustments to NER. This was particularly evident in the 
case  of  the  CFA  zone  countries  that  performed  very  poorly  until  the  CFA  franc 
devaluation of 1994 (Shatz and Tarr, 2000). Rather than devaluing their currencies, 
countries responded to RER appreciations by imposing further exchange controls and 
import restrictions, which aggravated the situation. 
  In contrast, the achievements of the HPAEs are accredited to their successful 
exchange rate policies. HPAEs avoided overvaluing their exchange rates to encourage 
exports. In consequence, their exchange rate management policies are seen as the key 
to their successful, long-term economic performance. Although it is acknowledged 
that these countries embarked upon industrialisation with protectionist policies, they 
subsequently  rapidly  liberalised  their  trade  and  adopted  outward  oriented  trade 
policies.  According  to  a  World  Bank  report,  "several  HPAE  governments  used 
exchange rate policies to offset the possible adverse impact of trade liberalisation on 
producers  of  import-substitutes.  A  few  went  beyond  this  objective  [...]  and  used 
deliberately under-valued exchange rates to assist exporters."
7 The report argues that 
during  the  1980s,  Taiwan,  Korea  and  Indonesia  in  particular,  deliberately  under-
valued  their  currencies  to  boost  their  exports  and  "[o]ne  can  see  a  fairly  clear 
relationship  between  devaluations  and  export  growth  in  the  1980s"  (World  Bank, 
1993:126).  Although  the  above  views  slightly  overstate  the  role  of  exchange  rate 
policy  in  economic  success,  they  are  widely  accepted  by  many  researchers.
8  This 
                                                            
7 World Bank (1993: 125). The report appears not to criticize the "undervalued exchange rates" in these 
countries. This clearly contradicts the free-market exchange rate approach and implies "mercantilism". 
As argued earlier from the logic of neoclassical static-efficiency, undervalued exchange rates are as 
inefficient as overvalued exchange rates.  
8 The majority of empirical work has produced evidence supportive of the above arguments. Some 
literature,  however,  has  contested  these  findings.  See  for  example  Mengisteab  (1995)  and  Weeks 
(1993).   11 
section will demonstrate that the above interpretation of the policies adopted by the 
HPAEs is erroneous and not supported by the evidence. 
  Before we proceed to present our empirical work, one point should be clarified 
from  the  outset.  Our  analysis  will  not  be  based  on  the  concepts  of  ERER, 
overvaluation  or  misalignment.  As  argued  earlier  in  section  two,  the  ERER  is  a 
theoretical construction and strictly rooted in the general equilibrium paradigm. It is a 
vague concept and in our view, cannot be accurately measured. All of the various 
methods of measuring ERER are problematical. As a result, the empirical literature on 
the  impacts  of  overvaluation  on  economic  performance  is  weak.  For  the  sake  of 
limitations of space, we will not cover the weaknesses of this empirical literature but a 
comprehensive critique can be found in Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000). Instead the 
analysis will be limited to a defence of the argument that the exchange rate policies 
adopted by East Asian countries were not different from those of other developing 
countries. We will proceed by observing the RER patterns of the HPAEs in order to 
challenge  the  idea  that  the  exchange  rates  of  the  East  Asian  countries  remained 
constant or depreciated gradually (Roemer, 1994). 
In other words the focus of this paper shifts from ERER to a comparison of 
RER movements through time. These two concepts, although related, are distinct and 
such a shift enables a number of issues that need to be addressed to come to the fore. 
The  former  refers  to  the  relation  between  the  actual  value  of  a  currency  and  its 
equilibrium value at a given point in time, whilst the latter refers to a change in the 
value  of  the  currency  over  time.  These  two  are  not  comparable.  The  empirical 
evidence  we  will  present  demonstrates  that,  if  anything,  the  RERs  of  HPAEs 
appreciated relative to other countries during the last three decades. This does not, 
however, necessarily imply that their RERs have become overvalued for two reasons. 
Firstly, it could be the case that, the RERs of HPAEs remained undervalued 
relative  to  the  ERER.  In  the  same  vein,  African  and  Latin  American  countries 
maintained overvalued currencies, despite the fact that during the time period studied 
(1970s to 1990s) the RERs of HPAEs may have appreciated (and therefore became 
less undervalued) and those of African and Latin American may have  depreciated 
(and therefore became less overvalued). Secondly, an appreciation of the RER does 
not  necessarily  mean  overvaluation  as  it  may  simply  reflect  a  change  in  the 
“fundamentals”.    12 
The first argument can easily be tackled by using the length of the time period 
studied. The initial level of undervaluation (overvaluation) of the RERs for HPAEs 
(African and Latin American) is unlikely to be so large as to be maintained in thirty 
years  time  period.  Moreover,  regardless  of  over/undervaluation,  if  the  RERs  of 
HPAEs have appreciated and those of African and Latin American have depreciated, 
this  would  still  have  a  negative  (positive)  impact  on  HPAEs’  (African  and  Latin 
American) exports. Moreover, it can be argued that overvalued RER are as inefficient 
as undervalued RERs from the logic of the neoclassical economics.  
The second issue is more serious. It is indeed true that a RER appreciation may 
be caused by many factors such as changes in productivity of exportables and home 
goods, and does not imply a loss of competitiveness. Unfortunately due to the lack of 
data it is not possible to control such factors. That is the reason why we confine our 
analysis  to  challenge  the  above  view  that  the  exchange  rates  of  the  East  Asian 
countries  remained  constant  or  depreciated  gradually.  This  argument  is  clearly 
presented and repeatedly argued in the literature. Before pursuing these arguments 
further, a brief discussion of the methods of measuring the RER is necessary. 
 
4. Measuring the Real Exchange Rate 
 
There are two generally accepted measures of RER, both of which yield different 
results.  The  conventional  measure  is  called  the  purchasing  power  parity  RER 
(hereafter referred to as multilateral RER or MRER) that is defined as: 
 
MRER = ER.PI / P 
 
where ER is the nominal exchange rate, PI and P are international and domestic prices, 
with the latter being measured by the consumer price index or wholesale price index. 
The second measure is called the "internal" real exchange rate (IRER) and can be 
defined as: 
 
IRER = PT/PH 
   13 
where PT is an index of the prices of tradable goods, and PH is an index of the prices 
for non-tradables or home goods.  
  Though MRER is the more conventionally used and preferred measure, IRER 
is more accurate because MRER does not take into account the commodity content of 
exportables.
9 MRER can only be accurate if all countries produce and export the same 
bundle  of  commodities.  Conventionally,  RER  is  used  to  measure  changes  in 
competitiveness. It is assumed that if a country’s inflation rate is above the world 
inflation  rate,  that  the  country  will  be  uncompetitive  in  terms  of  its  exports.  To 
increase  the  competitiveness  and  profitability  of  exporters,  an  exchange  rate 
devaluation is required to keep the RER constant. 
MRER,  however,  does  not  differentiate  between  the  prices  of  the  specific 
commodities that are exported. A country may become uncompetitive not only as a 
result of higher overall inflation, but also as a result of changes in the international 
market price of exportables. Several factors can account for a change in international 
commodity  prices;  demand  and  supply  conditions,  a  variety  of  shocks,  and 
productivity increases. These fluctuations are particularly significant for developing 
countries that usually export a limited number of primary commodities. As the prices 
of exportables fluctuate sharply and frequently, using a comparison of international 
and  domestic  inflation  rates  to  adjust  the  NER,  instead  of  using  the  prices  of 
exportable  commodities,  will  substantially  distort  RERs  and  not  reflect  any  real 
changes in competitiveness. 
  IRER, however, reflects the impact of relative overall price changes (inflation) 
as well as the impact of the relative price changes of tradables. This can be shown by 
the following. When the law of one price holds, the domestic and international prices 
of tradables will be related through the NER: 
 
PT = ER . PTI   
 
where PTI is the international price of tradables 
 
and 
                                                            
9 For a more in-depth discussion of the alternative measures of the real exchange rate see Hinkle and 
Montiel (1999), Masters and Ianchovichina (1998) and Holden (1991).   14 
 
IRER = ER . PTI / PH           
 
Thus, the IRER varies as a result of changes in the exchange rate, changes in the 
domestic prices of non-tradables and changes in the international prices of tradables. 
IRER  reflects  changes  in  the  international  prices  of  tradables  produced by market 
fluctuations  and  global  productivity  changes.
10  The  differences  between  the  two 
methods  of  measuring  RER  matter  because  they  can  produce  an  inconsistency  in 
results, some of which vary widely. The works of Masters and Ianchovichina (1998) 
on  Zimbabwe,  and  Holden  (1991)  on  South  Africa  illustrate  this  conundrum.  In 
Zimbabwe, MRER showed a depreciation between 1967 and 1987 whereas the IRER, 
in contrast, demonstrated a sharp appreciation (Masters and Ianchovichina, 1998:469). 
In the case of South Africa, the opposite is true with the MRER appreciating between 
1973 and 1987, while IRER depreciated (Holden, 1991:8-9). 
  Although better than MRER, the IRER is also not a perfect measure of RER. 
This is because of the so-called Ricardo-Balassa effect (Masters and Ianchovichina, 
1998) that suggests that the RER may appreciate as a result of faster productivity 
growth in the production of tradables than of home goods relative to other countries. 
The  index  could  additionally  be improved by using the trade-weighted average of 
several trading partners. Nevertheless, the IRER is a useful tool for measuring RER 
and has an additional advantage in that it is possible to calculate a composite IRER 
index across many countries. This allows for a comparison of different regions or 
country groupings. 
In the following section, IRER will be used as a measure of the RER. In some 
cases,  MRER  will  also  be  used  to  assess  the  consistency  of  the  results.  IRER  is 
calculated by using the price levels of home goods and exportables. These price levels 
in turn are calculated by dividing the nominal values by the real values.
11 A weighted 
average price for tradables can also be introduced to construct a composite index for 
the price of tradables. Alternatively, the relative price of exportables to home goods 
                                                            
10 This formula can also be adjusted to take into account the ad valorem taxes and marketing margins. 
See Masters and Ianchovichina (1998: 466). 
11 For example, in order to calculate the price index of exportables (PX), we divided the nominal export 
values (in current U.S. dollars) by the real export values (in constant 1995 U.S. dollars). The data is 
taken from World Bank’s World Development Indicators.   15 
(PX/PH) can be used, since a change in the NER would not alter the relative price of 
exportables and importables (PX/PM).
12 
 
5. The Empirical Results 
 
Figure 1 which illustrates the trends in IRER, MRER and NER (an increase implies 
depreciation) and terms of trade for the HPAEs between 1960 and 1998 provide some 
interesting  insights.  In  the  case  of  Japan,  the  IRER, MRER and NER appreciated 
continuously between 1960 and 1996 and depreciated as a result of the Asian crisis. 
Hong Kong’s IRER also appreciated continuously between 1960 and 1998 particularly 
from 1974 onwards. The MRER data is available only for the 1990-98 period and 
shows an appreciation. After a period of fluctuation between 1960 and 1965, Korea’s 
IRER  appreciated  continuously  between  1965  and  1996  (except  for  1972-74  and 
1979-80),  and  depreciated  considerably  after  1996.  Therefore,  the  World  Bank’s 
(1993: 126) contention that "Korea used exchange rate protection from 1986 to 1989 
when it ran a current account surplus" is not supported by the evidence. In fact this 
argument is surprising because not only did the IRER but also the MRER and the 
NER appreciated during this period. Although NER depreciated from 1960 to 1986, 
MRER  fluctuated  and  indicated  no sign of depreciation. For Singapore, the IRER 
figures are not available for the period before 1979 and after 1993, but the available 
data shows that IRER appreciated very sharply between 1980 and 1993. MRER and 
NER were stable between 1960 and 1972, and then they appreciated sharply until 
1974. After 1974 NER continued to appreciate whereas MRER slightly depreciated 
until  1987  and  appreciated  again  slightly.  Overall  there  is  sign  of  depreciation. 
Thailand’s IRER appreciated between 1960 and 1973, then depreciated until 1980, 
and  once  again  appreciated  until  the  Asian  crisis.  On  average  there  is  no  sign  of 
depreciation between 1960 and 1996. For Malaysia and Indonesia, two oil exporting 
countries, the IRER fluctuated considerably. After a period of appreciation between 
1960  and  1972,  Malaysia’s  IRER  depreciated  until  1980  as  a  result  of  oil  price 
increases,  and  appreciated  again  until  1996.  For  Indonesia,  the  IRER  depreciated 
between  1967  and  1984,  again  predominantly  due  to  oil  price  hikes,  and  then 
fluctuated between 1984 and 1997. Figure one shows that China is the only HPAE 
                                                            
12 In other words, a NER devaluation would change (PX/PH) and (PM/PH) equally.      16 
country  that  experienced  continues  depreciation  of  its  currency  between  1960  and 
1994. Apart from China and Hong Kong, the impact of the Asian crisis on currencies 
is clear. The IRER, MRER and NER all sharply depreciated for Thailand, Indonesia, 
South Korea, Malaysia; and less drastically for Japan and Singapore. This study of the 
IRER and MRER offers no evidence that validates the argument that HPAEs used 
RER  devaluations  for  competitive  purposes.  Apart  from  China,  in  virtually  all 
HPAEs, the RER appreciated during the 1980s.  
  The evidence so far, however, should be interpreted with caution as it does not 
necessarily disprove the argument that the exchange rate policy may have played an 
important part in promoting exports for two reasons. Firstly, the appreciation of IRER 
could result from the Ricardo-Balassa effect.  The HPAEs have significantly altered 
the  composition  of  their  exports  during  the  period  under  review.  Therefore,  the 
appreciation  of  IRER  could  simply  reflect  changes  in  the  composition  of  exports 
toward goods with a high productivity increase and falling relative prices. In general, 
observing  productivity  change  for  tradables  and  home  goods  would  reveal  useful 
information. In the absence of relevant data, however, the terms of trade could provide 
some rough ideas on the significance of the Ricardo-Balassa effect. If the price of 
exportables declines relative to home goods due to a significantly faster productivity 
increase, it would also decline against the price of importables. Therefore, one would 
expect somewhat a positive correlation between IRER (PX/PH) and the terms of trade 
(PX/PM).  Obviously,  if  a  decline  in  the  terms  of  trade  due  to  a  decline  in  the 
international  price  of  exportables  were  neutralised  by  nominal  exchange  rate 
devaluations, there would be no correlation between the terms of trade and IRER. If a 
decline  in  the  terms  of  trade  comes  from  a  productivity  increase  in  exportables, 
however,  this  would  not  require  any  exchange  rate  adjustments.  Therefore,  a 
correlation between the terms of trade and IRER would be expected. 
  An observation of the terms of trade in figure one provides no evidence for the 
Ricardo-Balassa effect for none of the HPAEs. If we focus on three countries with 
clear appreciation of both IRER and MRER, Japan, Hong Kong and Korea, only for 
Japan there is a sharp decline in the terms of trade between 1972 and 1980. Before 
1972 and after 1980 the terms of trade remains fairly stable and there is no meaningful 
correlation between the terms of trade and IRER. For Hong Kong and Korea the terms 
of trade remained fairly stable throughout the period covered and improved slightly.   17 
Therefore,  the  terms  of  trade  does  not  indicate  any  clear  Ricardo-Balassa  effect. 
Moreover, a simple regression between IRER and the terms of trade for the HPAEs 
provides no positive and significant correlation except for Indonesia and Malaysia. As 
discussed earlier, both countries export oil and therefore the positive correlation is 
likely to be a result of variations in prices in international oil markets but not a result 
of the Ricardo-Balassa effect. 
Secondly, during the 1980s, the exchange rates of most countries appreciated 
following the decade of depreciation in response to the 1970s’ oil crisis. Although 
many countries had responded to the oil price rises of 1973 and 1979 by dramatically 
devaluating  their  currencies,  they  then  reversed  this  policy  as  oil  prices  declined 
during the 1980s.
13 Therefore it is also necessary to evaluate the relative performances 
of the HPAEs in terms of RER devaluations. Even though their currencies appreciated 
during this period, the level of this appreciation may have been lower than in other 
countries. 
  Observation  of  the  IRER  and  MRER  seems  to  contradict this view. When 
countries are percentranked according to their degree of RER devaluation by using 
both measures of the RER for the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, HPAEs are not high on the 
list (see table 1).
14 For example, the first part of table 1 (IRER) indicates that during 
the 1960s, from our sample of 89 countries, Japan was ranked at the 12% level, Korea 
at 33%, Hong Kong at 36%, Thailand at 60%. This means that during the 1970s, 88% 
of 89 sample countries devalued their currencies more than Japan, 67% more than 
Korea,  64%  more  than  Hong  Kong  and  40%  more  than  Thailand.  Only  China  is 
ranked a relatively high 88%. During the 1970s, most countries felt the impact of oil 
shocks, but in Indonesia and Malaysia export prices were relatively high because, as 
oil  producers,  they  enjoyed  a  peripheral  share  of  the  windfall  prices.  The  table 
suggests that during the 1980s only Indonesia (88%), and in the 1990s only China 
(76%) and Indonesia (60%) experienced relative appreciation of their currencies.  
  During  the  same  periods,  the  much  criticized  Latin  American  and  African 
countries devalued their currencies more than the HPAEs. The lower part of table 1 
shows  average  percentranks  of  HPAEs,  Latin  American,  African  and  East  Asian 
                                                            
13 See table 2. 
14 Percentrank shows the rank of a value in a data set as a percentage of the data set. It is used to 
evaluate the relative standing of a value within a data set. In our sample 100 represents the highest and 
0 represents the lowest value.    18 
(includes HPAEs) countries. During the 1970s all groups scored the same. During the 
1980s and 1990s, however, African and Latin American countries outrun the HPAEs. 
In  other  words,  during  these  periods,  the  average  relative  depreciation  of  those 
countries has been higher than HPAEs. The second part of table 1 supports these 
findings. The relative RER devaluations of the HPAEs in terms of MRER are not 
particularly impressive. HPAEs seemed to have devalued their currencies more than 
African countries in the 1970s and more than Latin American countries during the 
1990s.  In  other  periods  and  on  average  African  and  Latin  American  countries 
exceeded HPAEs.
15 
  Finally,  table  2  provides  a  composite  index  of  the  IRER  for  Sub-Saharan 
Africa (CFA franc zone and other Sub-Saharan Africa countries), Latin America and 
the HPAEs. This index is constructed by treating the regions as countries. In other 
words, the relevant data for all countries were added up in current and constant terms 
and the relative prices of tradables and home goods were calculated by dividing the 
nominal  values  by  the  real  values.  Contrary  to  the  previous  exercise  where 
percentrank  of  countries  were  averaged,  thus  having  equal  weight  regardless  of 
economic size, in this index larger countries have bigger impact on the final index. 
Consequently  one  would  expect  these  indices  to  produce  similar  but  not  identical 
results.  In  order  to  limit  the  size  bias,  largest  countries  from  each  region  were 
eliminated.  These  are  Japan  and  China  in  HPAEs,  Mexico  and  Brazil  in  Latin 
America, and South Africa and Nigeria in Africa. As far as we are concerned such a 
composite  index  for  regions  has  never  been  used  before.  For  obvious  reasons  a 
composite index cannot be constructed by using the conventional MRER. 
  The figures show that all three regions responded to the oil crises of the 1970s 
by substantially devaluing their currencies. During this period, the IRER depreciated 
more in Latin America than Sub-Saharan Africa and the HPAEs. During the 1980s, 
however, the IRER appreciated for Latin America and the HPAEs. For Sub-Saharan 
                                                            
15 A comparison of these two measures reveals additional information. Although not reported here, our 
calculations indicate that the percentrank order of some African countries differ substantially between 
these two measures during the 1980s. In terms of MRER they are ranked very high, but their IRER 
ranking  is  very  low.  For  example  Ghana,  Tanzania  and  Zaire  are  ranked  at  69%,  97%  and  98% 
according to MRER devaluations, but their IRER devaluations are ranked at 2%, 11% and 47%. This 
can probably be attributed to a sharp fall in their terms of trade during the 1980s. As the international 
prices  of  exportables  declined,  they  responded  by  devaluing  their  currencies.  But  even  though  the 
devaluations were substantial, they were unable to eliminate the fall in the relative price of exportables 
and the IRER declined.   19 
Africa,  it  continued  to  depreciate  until  1990  and  then  appreciated  slightly.  Sub-
Saharan  Africa,  excluding  the  CFA  zone  countries,  shows  a  more  significant 
depreciation. Overall, between 1968 and 1997 Sub-Saharan Africa had the highest 
level of depreciation compared to Latin America and the HPAEs.  
  The CFA zone countries experienced a major RER appreciation between 1986 
and 1993 as a result of the appreciation of the French franc. There is no doubt that 
such  an  appreciation  cannot  be  healthy  and  must  have  had  considerably  negative 
impacts on these countries. However, even in the case of CFA zone countries, the 
relationship  between  RER  appreciation  and  export  performance  is  not  as  clearly 
established as the literature suggests. Table 3 shows the percentrank of CFA countries 
according to their degree of RER devaluation, and export performance for the pre-
appreciation period (1978-85), appreciation period (1986-93) and post-appreciation 
period (1994-97). 
During the first period (1978-85), most countries experienced substantial RER 
depreciations. All countries, except for Cote d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic 
and Mali, were percentranked higher than 50%. During the second period, only half of 
them experienced a substantial percentrank fall: Gabon, Cameroon, Togo, Senegal, 
Republic  of  Congo  and  Benin.  Three  countries  experienced an increase. The only 
evidence  of  a  clear  negative  relationship  between  overvaluation  and  export 
performance occurs in the Cameroon, Togo, Republic of Congo and Benin. For the 
other  countries  the  relationship  is  less  clear.  Gabon  for  example  experienced  a 
substantial percentrank fall in terms of IRER (80% to 3%) and an increase in terms of 
export performance (14% to 63%) in the second period. Chad, on the other hand, 
experienced  a  small  percentrank  increase  in  terms  of  RER  (51%  to  61%)  and  a 
substantial fall in terms of export performance (74% to 26%) in the second period. 
The foregoing evidence is sufficient to reject the common assertion that the 
strong export performances of the HPAEs were derived from RER devaluations. The 
empirical work we have presented so far does not provide any evidence to suggest that 
they have used "exchange rate protectionism" for competitive purposes. The World 
Bank Report for 1993 also argues that HPAEs have been successful in maintaining 
stable exchange rates, compared to some Latin American countries, thanks to their 
‘pragmatic macroeconomic management,’ and this relative stability is what underlies 
the Asian success. The stability of the RER reduced uncertainty and stimulated trade   20 
and foreign investment and other financial linkages. Table 4 shows the percentrank 
order of the countries according to their IRER and export stability indices.
16 Although 
not particularly impressive, the HPAEs appear to be in a better position in terms of 
exchange rate and export stability in comparison with Latin American and African 
countries.  To  analyse  a  possible  relationship  between  IRER  stability  and  export 
performance, the following simple regressions were estimated for 108 countries. 
 
1.     Exports growth  =   f (IRER instability)  - significant 
2.     Exports instability  =   f (IRER instability)  + significant 
3.     Exports growth  =   f (Exports instability)  - not significant 
4.     IRER instability  =   f (GNP per capita)  - significant 
5.     Exports instability  =   f (GNP per capita)  - significant 
 
The  results  suggest  some  interesting  insights  (see  table  5).  The  first  and  second 
regressions provide evidence for a negative relationship between RER instability and 
export  growth,  and  a  positive  relationship  between  RER  instability  and  export 
instability that seem to support the above scenario. Given these regressions, the World 
Bank would probably contest that causality may run from RER stability to export 
stability and export growth. In other words, countries that maintain a stable RER are 
likely to have more stable exports, thus superior export growth. The third regression, 
however, sheds doubts about the validity of this argument, as it provides no evidence 
for a significant correlation between export instability and exports performance. If 
RER stability has any positive impact on export performance, it must come from its 
stabilising  impact  on  exports.  If  there is no significant correlation between export 
stability and export growth however, IRER stability cannot be an important reason 
behind the superior HPAE export performance. The lack of significant correlation 
between exports growth and exports stability is somewhat surprising. However even if 
                                                            
16 Export stability is calculated by estimating the following simple regression:  
   Ln X = f (T) or (Ln X = a + bT), where X is exports in logarithmic form and T is time trend. 
Residuals from this regression were saved and their absolute values were divided with the fitted 
(estimates) values and summed S|e/Y^| where e is residual and Y^ is fitted (estimate) value. This gives 
variability of the variable around the time trend. 
  Real exchange rate stability can be calculated in two ways. One is the simple coefficient of 
variation through time and the second is the above regression method. Here both methods are employed 
since some countries show clear trends in their exchange rates such as China, Chad, Guinea-Bissau,   21 
there was a significant relationship between these two variables, one could still argue 
that  the  causality  may  run  from  a  good  export  performance  to  stable  exports  and 
IRER. In other words countries that have good export performance (that may result 
from appropriate industrial policies and stable international demand) are likely to have 
more  stable  export  performance  and  countries  that  have  more  stable  export 
performance  are  likely  to  have  more  stable  IRER.  In  this  view,  in  the  second 
regression  the  causality  could  run  from  export  instability  to  IRER  instability  as 
countries respond to export fluctuations by adjusting their RER. The fourth and fifth 
regressions provide support for this argument as the IRER and export instabilities are 
negatively correlated with per capita GNP, which suggests that fluctuations in export 
performance are related to a country’s level of development and the nature of the 
commodities  produced.  Exports,  and  thus  the  IRER  performance  of  developed 
countries, are more stable. Thus, it is plausible to argue that HPAEs had relatively 





The  debate  on  RER  management  is  a  subset  of  the  broader  debate  on  trade  and 
industrial  policy  and,  as  such,  cannot  be  analysed  in  isolation.  In  this  view, 
“overvaluation” may or may not result from exchange rate mismanagement but is seen 
as an integral part of overall industrial/trade policy. The line between these two is thin 
and  there  is  no  coherent  way  of  identifying  when  overvaluation  is  a  result  of 
mismanagement or as a result of trade policy. There are conceptual problems and 
ambiguities  in  measuring  ERER  that  render  it  difficult  to  construct  a  reasonable 
empirical  framework  from  which  to  gauge  the  impact  of  RER  policies  on  trade 
performance. Existing empirical literature does not produce a persuasive argument nor 
provide credible evidence to support the common assumption that the RER policies 
adopted  by  HPAEs  were  fundamentally  different  from  those  adopted  by  Latin 
American and Sub-Saharan Africa countries.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Sierra Leone and Singapore which make their exchange rate variation in terms of CoV very high. When 
this trend is removed, however, their exchange rates are more stable around this trend.    22 
  Rather than seeking a better measure of RER distortions, this article questions 
the view that the exchange rate policies adopted by HPAEs played an essential role in 
promoting exports by comparing changes in two measures of RER for HPAEs, Latin 
American  and  Sub-Saharan  African  countries.  The  empirical  work  undertaken 
provides  no evidence to support the argument that the RERs of HPAEs remained 
constant  or  depreciated  gradually  while  Latin  American  and  African  countries 
experienced massive overvaluations. The exchange rate policies of these East Asian 
countries were in no way different to those of other developing countries. In the time 
period studied, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that the HPAEs relied on 
exchange rate policies to promote exports and one needs to look elsewhere to find an 
explanation for success in stimulating exports. 
  A caveat is necessary here to buttress the emphasis in section four, that the 
focus of this paper is not on ERER but on a comparison of RER movements through 
time. The empirical evidence we have presented demonstrates only that the RERs of 
HPAEs did not depreciate (in fact appreciated) between 1970 and 1998 compared to 
Latin American and African countries. It could be the case, however, that African and 
Latin American countries maintained overvalued currencies, despite the fact that their 
currencies  depreciated  relatively.  Nevertheless,  given  the  time  period  studied,  the 
initial  level  of  overvaluation  is  unlikely  to  be  so  large  as  to  be  maintained.  As 
discussed  earlier,  the  RER  measures  that  are  used  in  this  paper,  both  IRER  and 
MRER, suffer from various weaknesses that are well recognised in the literature and 
the evidence should be interpreted cautiously. Therefore it is safer to argue that RER 
policies  of  the  HPAEs  have  not  been  proven  to  be  relevant  to  their  economic 
performance than arguing that they have been irrelevant. Despite their weaknesses 
these measures are widely used in the literature as we do not yet have a better measure 
and both measures consistently indicate no RER depreciation for the HPAEs.   
  Finally, it is important to note that none of the above arguments challenge the 
necessity of maintaining a “realistic” exchange rate in order to stay competitive in 
international markets. Good exchange rate policies are an essential part of a successful 
development  strategy.  However,  simplistic  arguments  that  endeavour  to  explain 
development  on  the  basis  of  one  or  two  policy  related  issues  are  misleading  and 
harmful. Development is a complex and multi-dimensional issue. Even though a focus 
on the role of trade policies can be educational, a narrow concentration on policy   23 
(mis)management can be deceptive. As Mason et al. (1998: 2) point out ‘[t]here is 
much  more  to  economic  development  than  sensible  monetary,  fiscal,  and  foreign 
exchange  policies.’  To  have  a  better  understanding  of  why  certain  countries  have 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1: Percentrank order of countries according to internal real exchange rate 
(IRER) and multilateral real exchange rate (MRER) devaluations 
 
  Percentrank of countries 
according to IRER 
devaluations 
  Percentrank of countries 
according to MRER 
devaluations 
Countries  1970s  1980s  1990s  Average 
1970-99 
  1970s  1980s  1990s  Average 
1970-99 
China  88  48  76  70    NA  NA  NA  NA 
Hong 
Kong 
36  60  11  36    NA  NA  NA  NA 
Indonesia  81  88  60  76    33  86  79  66 
Japan  12  23  17  17    9  14  12  11 
S. Korea  33  42  10  28    91  30  62  61 
Malaysia  67  14  25  35    51  36  27  38 
Singapore  NA  NA  NA  NA    41  24  16  27 
Thailand  60  27  67  51    73  41  40  51 
Average 
for: 
                 
HPAEs  53  43  38  45    50  39  39  42 
Latin 
America 
53  45  39  46    66  45  33  48 
Africa  53  59  66  59    40  65  64  56 
East Asia  48  42  43  45    44  44  36  41 
Source:  Constructed  from  raw  data  obtained  from  the  World  Bank  World 
Development Indicators.  
Note:  High  (low)  value  means  more  (less)  depreciation.  The  relevant  data  is  not 
available  in  World  Bank  Database  for  Taiwan.  For  IRER  89  and  for  MRER  103 
countries are used. HPAE includes 7 countries for IRER and 6 countries for MRER, 
the same figures for Latin America is 20 and 25, for East Asia 10 and 12, and for 
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HPAEs  WORLD 
1968  100  100  100  100  100  100 
1975  108  117  139  187  149  125 
1980  124  112  184  226  160  140 
1985  116  125  160  207  142  120 
1990  139  69  179  155  125  108 
1993  120  103  147  134  104  95 
1997  125  102  143  115  93  89 
Source:  Constructed  from  raw  data  obtained  from  the  World  Bank  World 
Development Indicators.  
Note: High (low) value means more (less) depreciation. In order to limit the size bias, 
largest  countries  from  each  region  were  eliminated.  These  are  South  Africa  and 
Nigeria  in  Africa,  Mexico  and  Brazil  in  Latin  America,  and  Japan  and  China  in 
HPAEs. Taiwan and Singapore were also excluded due to lack of complete data.   
 
 
Table 3: Percentrank order of CFA franc zone countries according to internal 
real exchange rate (IRER) devaluations and export growth rates (average rates 
across years).  
 
  IRER Devaluations    Export growth rates 
  1978-85  1986-93  1994-98    1978-85  1986-93  1994-98 
Gabon  80  3  98    14  63  22 
Cameroon  57  5  94    99  4  12 
Cote d’Ivoire  7  6  84    84  11  78 
Togo  82  15  87    62  3  77 
Cen. Afr. Rep  15  20  6    18  9  100 
Mali  21  27  79    69  53  87 
Senegal  60  28  97    12  23  33 
Congo, Rep.  92  39  95    78  15  63 
Benin  89  53  99    83  14  4 
Chad  51  61  81    74  26  67 
Burkina Faso  77  73  88    68  47  5 
Niger  94  75  53    4  5  29 
Source:  Constructed  from  raw  data  obtained  from  the  World  Bank  World 
Development Indicators.  
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Table 4: Percentrank order of countries according to export and internal real 
exchange rate (IRER) stability. (1968-97) 
 




















China  93  7  84    HPAEs  75  48  68 
H. Kong  91  81  71    East 
Asia 
61  44  60 
Indonesia  42  24  67    Africa  43  41  29 
Japan  92  52  82    LA  32  39  48 
S. Korea  74  54  41           
Malaysia  48  45  53           
Singapore  100  49  83           
Thailand  58  76  63           
Source:  Constructed  from  raw  data  obtained  from  the  World  Bank  World 
Development Indicators. The calculations includes 8 HPAE, 24 Latin American, 
12 East Asian and 35 African countries. 
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Table 5: Regressions on IRER instability, export instability, GNP per capita and 
export growth (1968-97) 
 




Coefficient  Constant  R-
Bar- 
Squ 































0.309  1.924  49.038* 
[106] 
 


















4  IRER 
instability 




0.170  1.747  22.932* 
[106] 
 
5  Export 
instability 





0.445  2.103  86.796* 
[106] 
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